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Choice Models
Katie Steele
1. Introduction
Adequate explanation and prediction of human behaviour often requires 
understanding the beliefs and values that motivate action. In this way, we 
gain a deeper understanding of the behaviour in question, beyond just not-
ing that it has some regularity. For instance, the hypothesis that Dave goes to 
church weekly is prima facie less informative than the hypothesis that Dave 
goes to church primarily because he is in love with another member of the 
congregation. Likewise, the hypothesis that many voluntary public goods 
projects fail is prima facie less informative than the hypothesis that certain 
projects fail because individuals do not place positive value on their own par-
ticipation and believe they can free ride on the efforts of others. In short, the 
social sciences involve special kinds of models that track our notions, based 
on common sense or ‘folk’ psychology, of the causes of human behaviour. 
These are models that depict the choices/behaviour of persons as resulting 
from what philosophers call, as we learn in Chapter 5, the persons’ ‘inten-
tional attitudes’—their beliefs and values.
Formal choice models are used to represent these subjective beliefs and val-
ues in a concise way. The field is commonly divided into three domains: deci-
sion theory, social choice theory, and game theory. Decision theory concerns 
the intentional attitudes and choices of a single person or agent. This is of 
intrinsic interest in psychology and cognitive science. In fact, decision theory 
has wide reach as it is a building block of the other two domains of choice 
models as well, which concern groups of agents. Social choice theory mod-
els a group of agents who must reconcile their attitudes in order to act as 
a single agent with ‘shared’ attitudes (think of voters who must settle on a 
choice of leader); social choice theory is employed in political science and 
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public economics, amongst other areas. Finally, game theory models strategic 
interaction amongst individuals—all choose their own course of action, but 
they strategize because the combination of choices affects the outcomes of all 
involved. Game theory is used extensively in (micro)economics, and increas-
ingly in sociology and other social science disciplines.
All of these domains of choice theory—decision, social choice, and game 
theory—are also used to explore normative questions, i.e. questions about 
how things should be done, rationally and/or morally speaking. Philosophers 
and other normative theorists appeal to choice theory to answer questions 
like ‘What constitutes rational choice attitudes?’ or ‘What group attitudes 
justly represent the attitudes of its constituent members?’ or ‘How should 
public institutions be designed to deliver adequate outcomes, given the atti-
tudes that citizens are likely to have and the strategic behaviour they are 
likely to engage in?’ These are all interesting questions, but they are not the 
focus in this chapter; here I am primarily interested in the use of choice mod-
els in the empirical sciences. I concentrate just on decision and game theory, 
in the interests of space, and also because social choice theory arguably has 
more normative than descriptive applications. In any case, we shall see, how-
ever, that the normative and descriptive perspectives on choice theory are 
intimately linked, for better and worse reasons.
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, the basics of individual 
decision and game models are introduced. I will then, in section 3, address 
criticisms of the deployment of these models in the social sciences. My gen-
eral position is that, while there is ample scope for criticizing particular appli-
cations of choice models, this should not be taken as an argument against 
choice modelling in the social sciences tout court.
2. Introducing Choice Models for the Social Sciences
This section introduces the basic notation for choice models in the social 
sciences. I consider, in turn, individual decision and game models. The two 
are not entirely distinct. It will come as no surprise that game models involve 
individuals. But game theoretic considerations also impact on individual 
decisions, so neither is obviously the more general choice model. To some 
extent, it is simply the case that the two kinds of models are useful in differ-
ent contexts.
2.1 Individual Decision Models
I shall first introduce individual decision models. The main components of 
these models are prospects and preferences. Prospects may be further divided 
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into acts, states, and outcomes. In this way, the complexity of an agent’s atti-
tudes towards the world is reduced to a relatively simple model.
In short, the agent has preferences over prospects. That is, there are vari-
ous ‘items’ or ‘states of affairs’ (the prospects) that the agent compares and 
ranks in terms of which ones he/she likes better than others (the preferences). 
The core prospects are acts, which, as the name suggests, are things that an 
agent can do of their own volition, like ‘pick the orange from the fruit bowl’, 
or ‘go to the park’, or, at a slightly grander level, ‘pursue graduate studies in 
psychoanalysis’.
Let us denote a weak preference for act Ai over act Aj as Ai ≥ Aj: either the agent 
strictly prefers Ai to Aj (written Ai > Aj ), or the agent is indifferent between Ai and 
Aj (written Ai ∼ Aj). Acts may be decomposed in terms of states of the world 
and outcomes. The states of the world are the possible (mutually exclusive) 
ways the agent thinks the world may be; this is the locus of the agent’s uncer-
tainty about the world. The uncertainty at issue may concern a very local 
and mundane issue like the result of a coin toss (where the states are ‘heads’ 
and ‘tails’), or, for more worldly decisions, the uncertainty may concern the 
economic prospects of a country (where e.g. the states may be ‘permitted 
to stay in the Eurozone with large debt repayments until 2020’, and so on). 
Associated with each act and state is an outcome, which is what will come 
about, at least from the point of view of the agent, if the act is performed and 
the state in question is the true state.
The relationship between acts, states, and outcomes is best appreciated by 
considering the typical tabular representation of a decision problem, as per 
Table 10.1.
For instance, we might be interested in Mary, who is very conscientious 
and prudent; we want to know what she will do when confronted with vari-
ous health insurance options. The acts A1 . . . Ar are possible insurance pack-
ages she could purchase. The states S1 . . . Sn represent the relevant possible 
scenarios that Mary envisages. For example, S1 might be the state where she 
has only minor ailments during the next ten years, while S2 is the state where 
she has some significant but not critical health problem, like reduced eye-
sight. The outcomes O1,1 . . . Or,n are the various possible outcomes that Mary 
Table 10.1 Tabular representation 
of decision problem
S1 S2  . . . Sn
A1 O1,1 O1,2  . . . O1,n
A2 O2,1 O2,2  . . . O2,n
 . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .
Ar Or,1 Or,2  . . . Or,n
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anticipates, given the insurance benefits and her health prospects. For exam-
ple, O2,2 might be the outcome that Mary loses much vision yet her insurance 
gives her free access to consultations and glasses, etc.
The agent has preferences over the acts of the decision problem of interest, 
but we presumably need to work out/predict what these preferences are. This 
is done by making assumptions, perhaps based on past observations, about 
the agent’s beliefs and desires. Shortly I shall expand on the basis for these 
assumptions; for now, note that, standardly, the agent’s beliefs about the 
states of the world are represented by a probability function, Pr, over these 
states, and the agent’s relative desires for the basic outcomes are represented 
by an interval-valued utility function, U, over these outcomes (to be explained 
shortly). For example, the strength of Mary’s belief that she will have only 
minor ailments in the next ten years might be 0.7, and in this case, by the 
rules of probability, the strength of her belief in the contrary is 0.3. A utility 
function is interval-valued or cardinal just in case the differences between the 
utilities are meaningful in the following way. If, say, the decision outcome for 
minor ailments under package A1 has utility 10, the outcome under package 
A2 has utility 4 and the outcome under package A3 has utility 1, then Mary 
prefers the A1 outcome to the A2 outcome twice as much as she prefers the 
A2 outcome to the A3 outcome. By contrast, if Mary’s utility function were 
only ordinal, then the differences in utilities would be meaningless and all we 
could infer from the specified values is that Mary prefers the A1 outcome to 
the A2 outcome to the A3 outcome.
1
The standard calculus for deciding between options or acts is the expected 
utility principle, which claims that a (rational) agent’s preference ranking 
tracks expected utility, or the average utility for a prospect given the prob-
abilities and utilities for each of the possible outcomes, such that:
Ai ≥ Aj IF and only IF
 
Pr( ) ( ) Pr( ) ( ), ,S U O S U On i n
n
n j n
n
× ≥ ×∑ ∑
 
In other words, one act is preferred to another act just in case, for the first act, 
the sum over all the states of the world of the probability of the state multi-
plied by the utility of the outcome of the act in that state is greater than this 
1 Note that an interval-valued utility function is more formally described as a utility function 
that is unique up to positive linear transformation. In general, the uniqueness conditions associated 
with a mathematical measure tell us what information is given by the measure. To say that the 
utility function is unique up to positive linear transformation is to say that, if e.g. chocolate ice-cream 
has utility 5 while vanilla has utility 2, then this very same information is represented by utilities 
5m + c and 2m + c, for any positive m and any c. In other words, no conclusions should be based 
on the utility values 5 and 2 that do not also hold for utility values 5m + c and 2m + c.
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same sum for the second act. In the case of indifference, the sums for the acts 
are equivalent. Note that the utility function, U, must be interval-valued or 
cardinal, otherwise it is not meaningful to multiple utilities with probabilities 
and then sum these terms.
If we can characterize Mary in terms of her probabilities for states and her 
cardinal utilities for outcomes, then we can work out her preferences for 
health insurance packages, provided we also assume she is an expected util-
ity maximizer. But one might well ask what justifies characterizing Mary in 
this way. Indeed, this is a significant part of the scientist’s task. Recall Mary’s 
example utility function, where the outcome for minor ailments under pack-
age A1 has utility 10, the outcome under package A2 has utility 4, and the 
outcome under package A3 has utility 1. How could we know that this is 
Mary’s utility function? That is, how could we know that she prefers the A1 
outcome to the A2 outcome twice as much as she prefers the A2 outcome to 
the A3 outcome?
In the 1920s Frank Ramsey proposed an ingenious way to determine, at 
least in theory, a person’s utility function over outcomes and their probability 
function over states of the world. It involves asking the person to rank a large 
number of bets. One must also assume that the person is an expected utility 
maximizer, i.e. they rank bets according to the rule just stated. Sometime later 
in the 1940s von Neumann and Morgenstern developed a similar method for 
measuring a person’s utility; on their account we need to know the person’s 
preference ranking over a large number of lotteries. By way of example, here 
is a very simple construction of a cardinal utility scale for the three holiday 
destinations Rome, Paris, and Barcelona. Assume the agent has the follow-
ing preference ranking over the destinations: Rome > Barcelona > Paris. Now 
there is some lottery over Rome and Paris with objective probability p, i.e. a 
lottery that has chance p that the agent will go to Rome, and chance 1 − p 
that the agent will go to Paris, such that the agent is indifferent between 
this lottery and Barcelona. The probability p for this lottery is the utility for 
Barcelona, if the utility for Paris is set at 0 and the utility for Rome at 1, 
since then the expected utility calculations are in keeping with the claim that 
the agent is indifferent between Barcelona and the lottery. (Note that the 
expected utility for the lottery is p × 1 + (1 − p) × 0 = p). We can check that this 
makes sense by considering a couple of cases. If going to Barcelona is only 
marginally worse than going to Rome, then the agent would require a very 
high probability for Rome to be indifferent between Barcelona and the lot-
tery. After all, the lottery might land the agent in Paris. In this case, the utility 
for Barcelona matches this high probability. On the other hand, if Barcelona 
is just a bit better than Paris, then the agent would require only a small prob-
ability for Rome to be indifferent between Barcelona and the lottery; this 
small probability is then the utility for Barcelona. So we see that lotteries 
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enable a utility representation of an agent’s preferences over prospects. We 
could use this construction of the agent’s utility function (in addition to the 
probabilistic measure of their beliefs) to predict the agent’s preferences in 
other more complex decision problems. In Mary’s case, we might test how 
she ranks a number of lotteries involving her basic health outcomes, and so 
determine her utility function over these outcomes. We could then use this 
utility function to predict what she would choose in the ‘real-life’ decision of 
choosing a medical insurance option.
Even if a person’s utility and probability functions may be determined from 
their preferences over bets/lotteries, there is still the large question of how to 
elicit these preferences. It is difficult to ascertain a person’s preferences over 
just a few prospects, let alone the many required for detailed measures of 
belief and desire. The key question is: what sort of data serve as evidence for 
an agent’s current preferences? The answer depends on how preference is to 
be understood, and in particular, what is the presumed relationship between 
preference and choice behaviour, and between preference and other psycho-
logical traits. I can only touch the surface of this issue here. An extreme yet 
surprisingly mainstream position, particularly in economics, is the so-called 
theory of revealed preference, which holds that preference simply is choice, or 
perhaps choice disposition, rather than some deeper psychological attitude. 
In that case, we cannot look further than a person’s choice behaviour in order 
to determine their preferences because these preferences are constituted by 
the choice behaviour and have no deeper grounding. It follows that decision 
models are reduced to mere descriptions of an agent’s choices, where the 
probability and utility functions are just mathematical constructs and not 
properly representative of belief and desire at all.
The revealed preference interpretation offers little by way of explanation 
and prediction of choice behaviour. It does not have the resources to express 
what particular features of a prospect an agent finds (un)desirable and there-
fore (un)choiceworthy. There is thus no way to determine whether some cur-
rent/future choice situation is relevantly similar to a past choice situation, 
such that one would expect an agent to behave similarly. In short, revealed 
preference theory has no inductive (predictive) power. Moreover, the view 
does not countenance an agent having irrational preferences or choosing 
contrary to their preferences, due to impulsiveness or weakness of will.
The more fruitful position is surely that preference is distinct from, but 
plays some kind of motivating role with respect to, choice behaviour. As 
such, choice behaviour is still important evidence for preferences. This might 
be choice behaviour in the laboratory, or in the wild, so to speak. Indeed, 
one could yet argue that choice behaviour and preferences are inextricably 
linked, whether on metaphysical or evidential grounds or both. For instance, 
some hold that preference, which is a psychological attitude, completely 
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determines choice behaviour, even if it is not identical to it. This is to say 
that it is impossible for a person to choose contrary to their preferences, and 
so phenomena like weakness of will would need some alternative explana-
tion. Others maintain a ‘causal gap’ between preference and choice, filled by 
strength of will, habits, urges, instincts, and the like. Either of these views 
may or may not be coupled with the evidential claim that choice behaviour is 
the only reliable evidence for preferences. Even if that were true, experiment-
ers must do much inferential work in deciphering choice behaviour if they 
want to construct appropriate utility functions for agents—the experimenters 
must make assumptions about how the agents perceive the options available 
to them, whether the agents have sufficiently reflected on their choices, and 
what are the agents’ relevant background beliefs. Alternatively, or in addition 
to observing choice behaviour, experimenters could ask agents outright what 
their preferences are over some prospects, or ask agents various questions that 
are deemed relevant to their preferences. Different techniques will be more or 
less successful in different contexts; indeed, the appropriate way to conceive 
of and elicit preferences in particular settings is a topic of debate amongst 
social scientists.
2.2 Game Models
Game models are intended to capture the special situation of strategic inter-
action between agents. ‘Strategic’ here does not necessarily mean conniving 
or in some way dishonest; it simply means that, when choosing a course of 
action, agents consider what others are likely to do and how this bears on 
the possible outcomes. There are many such situations in social life, from 
political manoeuvring during an election campaign to simple coordination 
problems like choosing to drive on one side of the road rather than the other. 
This section serves to introduce and interpret game models and to outline the 
standard ways of ‘solving’ games; section 3 discusses the usefulness of game 
models in the social sciences.
There are some basic components to the description of a game. First, there 
are the players—in the simplest case, two players. These players have a set of 
available acts or strategies, and we ultimately want to know which of these the 
players each choose. The rules or procedures of the game specify the outcomes 
for each player, given each possible combination of players’ strategies. Players 
have preferences over these outcomes, represented by a utility function that 
may be cardinal or ordinal. (Recall that for the former kind of utility function, 
unlike the latter kind, the distances between utility values are significant and 
represent strength of preference.) As already alluded to, the players may well 
be entirely self-regarding, but they need not be. As with individual decisions, 
in terms of preferences, agents in a game come in many stripes and colours.
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Table 10.2 depicts a normal-form (tabular) game model for two players; let 
us call the players ‘row’ and ‘column’. The table shows that both players have 
two possible strategies: ‘cooperate’ and ‘defect’. (The strategies of the ‘row’ 
player can be read off the rows of the table, while the strategies of the ‘col-
umn’ player can be read off the columns.)
The table describes a well-known type of game; it in fact depicts the original 
narrative used to illustrate this type of game. The story goes like this: there 
are two prisoners accused of a crime. The prisoners are told that if they each 
cooperate (i.e. confess), they will both get a light sentence. If they each rather 
defect (i.e. fail to confess), they will both get a harsh sentence. If one con-
fesses but the other does not, the one that confesses will get a very harsh 
sentence while the other goes free. The convention is for the utility payoff to 
‘row’ to be specified first in the appropriate cell of the table, followed by the 
utility payoff to ‘column’. Take the case where both players cooperate. That 
is, ‘row’ plays ‘cooperate’ and ‘column’ plays ‘cooperate’ as well. Here they 
both get light sentences, which for each of them is the second-best possible 
outcome. In the case that ‘row’ cooperates whereas ‘column’ defects, ‘row’ 
gets the worst outcome—a very harsh sentence—while ‘column’ gets the best 
outcome of going free. The reverse situation occurs if ‘column’ cooperates 
while ‘row’ does not. The paired outcomes associated with each pair of strate-
gies constitute the rules of the game.
I have here described a literal prisoners’ dilemma, but the reason Table 10.2 
describes what is known as a Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game, in the technical 
sense, is simply the pattern of outcome utilities associated with the pairs of 
strategies. This pattern can be seen more clearly if we replace the literal out-
comes with utilities as in Table 10.3. To characterize the PD game, the utilities 
need only be ordinal, i.e. only the ordering of the utilities matters and not 
the differences in their values. One can check that the ordering of the utility 
values reflects the preference ordering of the outcomes in Table 10.2.
There are many social scenarios involving two players (and many more 
involving more than two players, if we were to generalize) that have the pat-
tern of outcomes given in Table 10.3. The situation is one where free-riding, 
or defecting when the other cooperates, gives the most utility for the defector 
and the least utility for the cooperator. It is better that both cooperate, how-
ever, than both defect. An infamous example of the PD, at least according 
Table 10.2 A literal prisoners’ dilemma
Cooperate (confess) Defect (don’t confess) 
Cooperate (light sentence, light sentence) (very harsh sentence, go free)
Defect (go free, very harsh sentence) (harsh sentence, harsh sentence)
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to some, is the arms race of the Cold War, where cooperating is pursuing 
disarmament and defecting is continuing to stockpile weapons. Of course, 
it is questionable whether the PD model accurately characterizes the Cold 
War scenario, but it is not implausible that the players’ ordinal utilities (play-
ers here being national governments) were in line with those in Table 10.3. 
Other prime examples of PD games concern environmental protection. Here 
the agents may be national governments with a common interest in, say, 
global fish stocks or forestation or climate stability, or, at the other end of the 
spectrum, they may be individual citizens with a common interest in local 
air or river pollution. These are PD games just in case all prefer a sufficiently 
clean environment where everyone does ‘their bit’, to a polluted environ-
ment, and yet all players most prefer that the others refrain from polluting 
while they pollute and still enjoy a sufficiently clean environment. (It must 
also be the case that all players least prefer doing their bit when others don’t 
do theirs, presumably because this makes the do-gooders’ efforts futile.) Here 
again, it is questionable whether any particular environmental protection 
problem does in fact have the form of a PD game rather than another type 
of game. For one thing, it may be that polluting while others preserve the 
environment is not most preferred, perhaps because all players value helping 
the cause, or because even a small amount of pollution is damaging enough 
to be undesirable. In short, whether or not a scenario can be represented as a 
PD game as per Table 10.3 depends on the players’ preferences, and also the 
way the world is, both in terms of natural laws and social institutions, as these 
structures dictate the rules of the game.
Beyond the description of a game, there is the solution concept, which 
specifies how the agents eventually settle on their respective strategies and 
associated payoffs. The central solution concept in game theory is the Nash 
equilibrium, formulated by its namesake John Nash in the early 1950s in his 
graduate thesis. A Nash equilibrium is a combination of strategies such that 
each player’s strategy is the best response to the other player’s strategies. That 
is, each player’s strategy affords them the highest possible utility given what 
the other players do. A simple way to identify Nash equilibria in a two-player 
game model is to circle the row player’s maximum values for each column (i.e. 
row’s best response to each of the strategies that column might choose), and 
likewise circle the column player’s maximum values for each row. Remember 
Table 10.3 The general prisoners’ dilemma
Cooperate Defect
Cooperate (3,3) (−1,4)
Defect (4,−1) (0,0)
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that, for each strategy pair, the value for row is given first in the table cell, 
followed by the value for column. The Nash equilibria are the cells that have 
both row and column utility payoffs circled.
The PD game has only one Nash equilibrium: the strategy combination 
where both players defect, which yields the utility payoffs (0, 0) by the 
representation in Table 10.3. Note that if ‘row’ chooses to defect, then ‘col-
umn’ does best by also defecting, thereby gaining utility 0 rather than −1. 
Likewise, if ‘column’ chooses to defect, ‘row’ does better by also defecting, 
thereby gaining utility 0 rather than −1. That is why both players defecting 
is a Nash equilibrium; neither player can do better by switching to another 
strategy. None of the other strategy pairs are Nash equilibria. Consider the 
potential case where both ‘row’ and ‘column’ cooperate. This is not a Nash 
equilibrium because either player would do better by switching to defec-
tion, thereby gaining utility 4 instead of 3. In fact, the combination of both 
players defecting is a particularly robust kind of Nash equilibrium because 
it is a dominant solution for both players: for each player, the defect strategy 
is best, not just on the assumption that the other player is also playing 
their Nash equilibrium strategy, but no matter what the other player does. 
Even if ‘row’ is irrational and does not choose to defect, it is still better for 
‘column’ to defect, and vice versa.
In a Nash equilibrium (including the special case of a dominant solution), 
no player can do better by unilaterally switching to a different strategy. It is 
possible, however, that all players could do better by simultaneously switching 
to a different strategy, i.e. a Nash equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto optimal. 
A Pareto optimal strategy set is optimal in this sense: there is no other strategy 
set such that shifting to this strategy set would result in at least one player 
being better off and no player being worse off. The tragedy of the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma is that the one Nash equilibrium (here dominant solution) is the 
only strategy combination that is not Pareto optimal. Indeed, both players 
would be better off if they both cooperated. (Even the strategy pairs where 
one player defects and the other cooperates are Pareto optimal, because a shift 
to another strategy pair would result in at least one player—the one getting 
the maximum utility of 4—becoming worse off.) This is why the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma is said to illustrate the ‘failure of collective rationality’.
One might wonder what is so special about Nash equilibria, especially if 
they can in a sense yield inferior outcomes, as per the Prisoners’ Dilemma. 
The logic is as follows: when reasoning about what strategy to opt for, an 
agent knows the set-up of the game, including the utilities of all players, and 
they also know that other players know the set-up of the game, and that these 
other players know that the agent knows they know the set-up of the game, 
and so on. Some claim that it is this common knowledge assumption—the cycle 
of ‘I know you know I know you know etc.’ reasoning—that leads to the 
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privileging of Nash equilibria, which are joint best responses to each other’s 
strategies. Others disagree that common knowledge leads players to reason 
their way to Nash equilibria; there is simply an additional assumption that 
the players each believe their opponents will choose the/a Nash equilibrium 
strategy, perhaps due to the history of plays of the game. In any case, game 
theory rests on the assumption that players make ‘intelligent’ choices that 
lead them to settle on Nash equilibria. Either the players reason intelligently 
all the way to Nash equilibria, in which case it is necessary that they have 
rational preferences and are aware of the game description, or, at the other 
end of the spectrum, the players do not reason at all but are subject to envi-
ronmental or ‘selective’ pressures that favour players who at least act as if they 
intelligently choose Nash equilibria after repetitions of the game.
Note that it may be desirable to treat the selective-pressure/evolutionary 
interpretation of Nash solutions explicitly. Indeed, this has given rise to evo-
lutionary game theory, which finds application in biology as well as social sci-
ence. The games in these models can even be ‘played’ by unconscious entities 
like bacteria that pursue strategies in an automated fashion. Strategies are 
replicated according to their success. The solution concepts of evolutionary 
game theory are in many ways similar to those of regular game theory, but 
there are differences, and of course the set-up and interpretation of the mod-
els differ (Alexander 2009). This chapter does not explore evolutionary game 
theory, but rather sticks to games with genuinely intelligent players.
Nash equilibria are central in this way:  it is widely regarded a necessary 
condition of a game solution that it be a Nash equilibrium. Some games have 
multiple Nash equilibria, however, and this raises the question of what are 
sufficient conditions for something to count as the game solution. Game theo-
rists refer to this as the ‘refinement program’.
A number of games with multiple Nash equilibria arguably feature in 
social life. In many such cases, the question of what is the unique equilib-
rium ‘solution’ of the game is pressing. For example, the game in Table 10.4 
represents a typical coordination problem; provided agents play the same 
strategies, the outcome is good. The game is commonly known as the ‘driving 
game’ because the choice of two players of whether to drive on the left or the 
right side of an isolated country road is a simple coordination problem that 
fits the pattern. We see that the top left and the bottom right entries in the 
table, corresponding to both players choosing ‘left’ and both choosing ‘right’ 
respectively, result in each player receiving (ordinal) utility 1. Both of these 
strategy combinations are Nash equilibria: if one player opts for ‘left’ then 
the best response of the other player is also ‘left’, and likewise if one player 
opts for ‘right’, then the best response of the other player is also ‘right’. Note 
that these two Nash equilibria are also Pareto optimal. The question then 
arises: what if the players shoot for different Nash equilibria?
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This will yield bad outcomes. If one player plumps for the ‘left’ Nash equi-
librium while the other player plumps for the ‘right’ Nash equilibrium, then 
we are in the top right or bottom left entries of the table, where the players 
receive -1 utility apiece. So in this game, it is important that the players aim 
for the same Nash equilibrium. (In other games, it may not be important that 
the players aim for the same Nash equilibrium, if their utility payoffs are in 
any case unaffected.)
The question of what Nash equilibrium players will/should aim for argu-
ably depends on principles that go beyond game theory proper, like which 
equilibrium is more salient for all players. For instance, in a literal driving 
game on an isolated country road, presumably the salient equilibrium is the 
one that accords with the driving rules of the nearest municipality, whether 
this be ‘always drive on the left’ or ‘always drive on the right’. Note that there 
are many coordination problems that have the formal structure of a driving 
game, as given in Table 10.4, and the conditions for salience will differ in 
these different applications. For instance, consider the case where two com-
plementary NGOs can achieve good outcomes if they each target the same 
community, but there will be no good result if they divide their efforts. How 
should they each proceed? Presumably, if the NGOs were able to come to an 
agreement on which equilibrium to aim for (i.e. which community to direct 
their efforts at), this equilibrium would be very salient indeed. The NGOs 
would have no reason to deviate from such an agreement. Other game situ-
ations, however, may not lend themselves to straightforward negotiations 
regarding multiple equilibria; a major obstacle is when different equilibria are 
better for different players.
Indeed, the ‘driving game’ is just one example of a simple game structure with 
multiple Nash equilibria. There are other similar kinds of games, and moreo-
ver, these sorts of games are arguably more prevalent in the social world than 
the tragic Prisoners’ Dilemma. Indeed, as we can see in Chapter 11, Cristina 
Bicchieri argues as much, by appeal to social norms; in brief, she claims that 
we internalize social norms, like ‘one must do one’s bit for community pro-
jects rather than free-riding on the efforts of others’, such that satisfaction 
and thereby utility is gained from obeying the said norms, or otherwise lost 
by disobeying the norms. This phenomenon of norm-internalization serves to 
Table 10.4 Multiple Nash 
equilibria: the driving game
Left Right
Left (1,1) (−1,−1)
Right (−1,−1) (1,1)
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‘convert’ a scenario that would otherwise be a PD game, for instance, into a 
more benign game with better collective equilibria. Of course, for multiple 
equilibria, there remains the issue raised of whether agents can coordinate 
effectively.
There are many more facets to game theory, and its applications are much 
richer in variety than have been touched upon here. For instance, there are 
game models for any number of players, not just two. There are game models 
that distinguish the order in which players choose their strategies, and the 
amount of information they each have about the prior choices of the other 
players. There are special considerations that apply to repeated plays of the 
same game. And, as mentioned earlier, there is the burgeoning area of evo-
lutionary game theory, which increasingly finds application in the biologi-
cal and social sciences, and which can accommodate players that merely act 
as if they are intelligent upon repetitions of a game. These are just some of 
the further dimensions to game theory. The most powerful contributions of 
game theory to the social sciences are arguably the more basic ideas, however, 
which I have introduced here.
3. Ideal Type and its Discontents
Having introduced formal choice models for the social sciences, we now con-
sider criticisms of their deployment. The critics have two main targets: the 
idealized characterisation of individuals in choice models, and the fact that 
individuals and not societies are the primary building blocks of models of 
social interaction. I discuss these in turn. My general point is that standard 
criticisms of choice models tend to overshoot; one must bear in mind the 
general limitations of scientific modelling and also appreciate that choice 
models come in a variety of forms.
3.1 Standard Decision Theory: Unfalsifiable or Simply False?
There is a temptation to reject wholesale the project of generalizing and pre-
dicting human motivation and behaviour. But this is surely too pessimistic 
and casts doubt on the social sciences as a whole. Indeed, Max Weber (1864–
1920), claimed to be one of the ‘principal architects of modern social science’, 
started from a more optimistic position. Weber argued that the social scien-
tist’s aim, unlike the historian’s, is not to represent the vagaries in attitudes of 
some particular persons, but rather to represent attitudes and behaviour that 
can be generalized across people and/or across time and which therefore have 
explanatory value. To use Weber’s terminology, the social scientist explains 
and predicts on the basis of ideal types.
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According to Weber himself, a key ideal type for the social sciences is the 
agent who rationally furthers her own ends, or who, in other words, has 
rational preferences over prospects. Weber’s claim then is that, when stud-
ying human behaviour and social interaction, it is useful to depict agents 
as making choices on the basis of rational preferences. This assumption is 
indeed borne out in the social sciences, and particularly in economics; while 
we know that people sometimes act irrationally or have inconsistent prefer-
ences, it is assumed that such cases of irrational behaviour are temporary 
deviations that in some sense ‘cancel out’ in large groups or in the long run. 
Consequently, the ideal type in economics as well as other disciplines is com-
monly in line with the standard theory of rational choice outlined in the pre-
vious section—expected utility (EU) theory. As such, EU theory is the locus of 
criticism with respect to formal choice models in the social sciences. Oddly, 
however, EU theory is criticized on two opposing fronts: some argue that the 
theory is unfalsifiable, i.e. that it cannot be proven wrong and so is vacuous, 
while others argue that it is outright false. How could both of these views 
have gained purchase? I claim that it is due to different understandings of the 
flexibility of choice models.
Start with the charge that EU theory is descriptively false, even as an approx-
imation. Consider standard economic models—typically, the outcomes that 
agents are supposed to care about are bundles of consumer goods, or money, 
and the more of these goods the agent procures for him or herself, the bet-
ter. In other words, it is standardly assumed that the only relevant distinc-
tion between decision outcomes is the amount of goods or money that will 
accrue to the agent. So, for example, $50 is always worth the same, no matter 
how this amount was procured, whether by hard labour or by cheating one’s 
friend, and two sacks of potatoes are better than one, regardless of these prod-
ucts’ provenance. It is easy to see that a real agent, and a perfectly rational one 
at that, may not be well described by an expected utility model constructed in 
this way. To begin with, the agent may not be indifferent between outcomes 
that are supposedly identical, like $50 procured by hard labour and $50 pro-
cured by cheating.
This point is perhaps more vivid when it comes to game models. To give an 
example: a classic game for characterizing and testing the bargaining behav-
iour of agents is the ‘Ultimatum Game’. In this game, there is some pot of 
goods, often just a sum of money that needs to be divided between the two 
players. The rules of the game are as follows. One player—the dealer—selects 
a split of ‘the pot’, and the other player—the receiver—decides whether or 
not to accept the split. So, for instance, the dealer might recommend a 50:50 
split (the fair strategy), or she might recommend, say, an 80:20 split (an unfair 
strategy), which is to say that she keeps 80 per cent of the pot and gives 20 
per cent to the receiver. If the receiver accepts, then each gets what the dealer 
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decreed, but if the receiver rejects the offer, neither gets anything. A simple 
version of this game, where the dealer has just the two strategies stated and 
where the pot is $10, is given in Table 10.5.
The outcomes of the game are specified in monetary amounts, and more-
over, these amounts are assumed to track the agents’ utilities. This is typical 
of game models in economics. But the Nash solution of ($8, $2) is not very 
compelling in this case, and indeed laboratory experiments and real-world 
observations suggest that agents in this kind of scenario overwhelmingly set-
tle on the ‘fair/yes’ strategy pair, i.e. the dealer offers 50:50 and the receiver 
accepts. Furthermore, it seems entirely rational for these agents to reject 
the apparent Nash solution: they care not just about money but also about 
whether justice has been done.
There are further limitations of EU models that distinguish outcomes only 
in terms of personal holdings of goods/money. Besides having altruistic ten-
dencies, many agents are sensitive to the menu of available options, and to 
what might have happened if they chose differently or if things turned out 
differently. So, for instance, an agent’s preference for relaxing at home over 
a luxury holiday might switch depending on whether a third option of an 
adventure holiday is available. (The latter might make the ‘stay-at-home’ 
option seem like the timid choice rather than the modest choice.) To give a 
different example: losing a gamble and receiving nothing may be better or 
worse depending on whether one might otherwise have won $10 or $1,000 
dollars. A decision problem developed by the late French economist Maurice 
Allais received much attention for exposing such attitudes of regret and its 
effect on agents’ evaluations of outcomes. These sorts of preferences are not 
consistent with an EU model that distinguishes outcomes only in terms of 
money/material goods.
Is expected utility theory then false, both descriptively and normatively? 
There is an obvious argument to the contrary: EU models must simply be 
sufficiently detailed such that outcomes include all properties that agents 
care about, including the well-being of others and unrealized possibilities 
that inspire feelings of regret/envy/self-critique. (Decision theorists use the 
term comprehensive outcomes.) Then there are no obvious conflicts between 
EU theory and reasonable choice behaviour. For instance, returning to the 
Table 10.5 Ultimatum game 
with monetary outcomes
Accept Reject
Fair ($5, $5) ($0, $0)
Unfair ($8, $2) ($0, $0)
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Ultimatum Game, the monetary amounts apparently do not represent typi-
cal agents’ utilities for outcomes. The ‘right’ characterization of the game is 
plausibly as per Table 10.6. The δ and θ amounts here represent the utility and 
disutility associated with fair play and unfair play respectively. In this case the 
‘fair/yes’ strategy pair may well be a Nash equilibrium. Likewise, if outcomes 
in decisions include the properties that inspire regret or risk attitudes, then EU 
theory may well capture common choice behaviour amongst risky options.
This brings us to the other critique of expected utility theory:  that it is 
unfalsifiable. The charge here is that EU theory is not false precisely because 
it cannot be proven false. Perhaps in avoiding one problem we run into 
another: if outcomes are so comprehensive that they include everything that 
an agent cares about, it would seem that EU and game models could be fitted 
to any choice behaviour and social interaction whatsoever. This would sug-
gest that the theories in fact have no empirical/descriptive content; there is 
no substance to the claim that an agent is an expected utility maximizer, or 
chooses Nash equilibrium strategies, because the agent could not fail to have 
preferences of this sort.
For instance, I mentioned the phenomenon of regret that Maurice Allais 
saw as a challenge to EU theory, at least from the descriptive point of view. 
Allais showed that people seem to value possible outcomes differently depend-
ing on what are the other possible outcomes that they might have received 
instead. To give a new example, consider someone who values the outcome 
‘win travel scholarship’ differently, depending on whether the other possible 
outcome was ‘win nothing’ or ‘win travel scholarship plus living expenses’. 
These different evaluations of the same outcome, depending on what are the 
other chancy outcomes, are not consistent with EU theory. There is, how-
ever, a way to accommodate such regret phenomena within EU theory. At 
the extreme, we can simply include in the description of an outcome what 
else might have, but did not, occur. The following could then be regarded as 
two distinct outcomes: ‘win travel scholarship when the other possibility was 
nothing’ and ‘win travel scholarship when the other possibility was a better 
scholarship’. Distinct outcomes can of course be evaluated differently by the 
lights of EU theory. But at what cost do we ‘save EU theory’ in this way? If, 
whenever an agent appears to care about more than just the expected utility of 
Table 10.6 Ultimatum game with 
comprehensive outcomes
Yes No
Fair (5 + δ, 5 + δ) (0, 0)
Unfair (8 − θ, 2 − θ) (0, 0)
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options, the attitudes in question, such as regret, can simply be accounted for 
by enlarging the description of outcomes, it is unclear whether maximizing 
expected utility has any substantial meaning. Indeed, a number of theorists 
have debated this issue. A similar worry applies to game models. If, whenever 
agents appear to strategize at odds with Nash equilibria, we can simply rede-
fine the game so that the utility functions track everything the agents seem 
to care about (as per my treatment of the Ultimatum Game), the theory is 
apparently unfalsifiable, i.e. it cannot be proven wrong.
So we see that the question of whether EU/game theory is false or unfal-
sifiable depends on the level of detail in which we may describe decision 
outcomes. The trouble is, it is very difficult to justify any particular level of 
detail, or any particular list of properties that may be used to distinguish the 
outcomes. This is a very pressing question for normative inquiry—it would be 
worrying indeed if our theories of rational choice were wrong or vacuous. The 
question is not so relevant for empirical uses of choice models, however, and 
this is our interest here. Note that there is an important difference between 
EU theory being unfalsifiable, and any particular EU model being unfalsifiable. 
In the former case, the key issue is whether it is only rational preferences/
choice behaviour that can be represented by some EU model, or whether in 
fact all preferences/choice behaviour can be represented by some EU model. 
The arguments in the literature and my comments concerning regret atti-
tudes are directed at this issue. This need not concern us as social scientists 
however. The important question for us is whether particular EU/game mod-
els that describe acts/states/outcomes in a specific way are adequate or inad-
equate for given descriptive, explanatory, or predictive tasks. For instance, 
does an EU model with utility increasing linearly with net family income 
adequately describe the impact on Bangladeshi families of a microfinance 
scheme? To give another example: is it useful, for the purposes of explain-
ing international climate action to date and predicting future prospects for 
cooperation, to characterize national governments as playing a Prisoners’ 
Dilemma game with respect to controlling their carbon dioxide emissions?
It is worth noting that it may well be empirically useful to treat EU theory 
as unfalsifiable. Francesco Guala has recently (2008) argued that EU theory 
is often used as a measuring instrument; we assume that an agent maximizes 
EU, and this allows us to measure her preferences in a given context and 
thereby characterize her with a particular EU model. The utility function 
(and/or the belief function) is determined by what model best ‘fits’ observed 
choice behaviour. Indeed, I noted earlier that using betting behaviour to infer 
an agent’s probabilistic beliefs and/or utilities for outcomes has a long pedi-
gree in decision theory that can be traced at least to Ramsey. Game theory 
can similarly serve as a measuring instrument. Under the assumption that 
agents maximize expected utility and opt for Nash equilibria, if both players 
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settle on the 50:50 split in the Ultimatum Game, for instance, we can infer 
that they care about fairness and not just monetary outcomes. In this way 
we come to understand the agents’ psychology and we have principled rea-
sons for including fairness properties, over and above monetary outcomes, in 
models intended for further predictive purposes.
There may be good reasons, however, to restrict the content of choice-model 
outcomes. Perhaps the model must achieve a certain amount of generality, or 
perhaps, if the model is to be practically viable, the identifying properties of 
outcomes must be measurable by independent means. This would presumably 
rule out subtle risk and fairness attitudes. In some applications, at least, it is 
surely the case that the best balance between simplicity and predictive power 
involves distinguishing outcomes only in terms of money/material goods.
In the case of crude outcomes, it should not be taken for granted that 
agents are best represented as expected utility maximizers. Indeed, once we 
acknowledge some slippage between empirical choice models and rational 
choice theory, the question arises as to whether non-EU models may be more 
adequate for at least some empirical purposes. One might argue that the ideal 
type in the social sciences need not be the rational type. Alternatively, one 
might argue that the ideal type is the rational type, and yet, when model out-
comes are crudely described, the rational type need not correspond to expected 
utility maximization. The properties of preferences that are linked to maxi-
mizing expected utility theory are plausibly self-evident requirements of 
rationality only if the preferences are interpreted as expressing an agent’s 
all-things-considered attitudes of approval. But this interpretation rests on 
outcomes ‘containing’ everything that an agent cares about. This is not 
typical of outcomes in empirical models—they are generally cruder or more 
restricted than this—and thus the corresponding preferences must be inter-
preted differently, and need not conform to the expected utility principle.
So-called behavioural decision theories may be understood in this light. 
These are proposed alternatives to EU theory, and include prospect theory, 
regret theory, satisficing theory, and various choice heuristics or shortcuts 
(see, for instance, Kahneman et al. 1982). Prospect theory, for example, devi-
ates from EU theory in this way. Instead of assessing acts in terms of the sum 
of the probability of each state multiplied by the utility of the outcome asso-
ciated with that state, the probability term (which, recall, represents belief) 
is transformed or converted according to the agent’s risk attitudes. The com-
parison of two acts Ai and Aj can then be written as follows:
Ai ≥ Aj IF and only IF
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This is very similar to the expected utility rule described earlier, except that the 
utility of outcomes is multiplied by r(Pr(Sn)) instead of simply Pr(Sn), where r 
stands for the agent’s (personal) risk function and is subject to the constraint 
that r(0) = 0 and r(1) = 1. The idea is that people tend to overweight or give 
extra importance to low probabilities, and underweight or give lesser impor-
tance to high probabilities. So, for instance, a probabilistic belief of 0.01 (that, 
say, one’s house will burn down) might be converted by the r function to 0.10, 
i.e. r(0.01) = 0.10, and a probabilistic belief of 0.99 (that, say, one will win a mil-
lion dollars) might be converted by the r function to 0.90, i.e. r(0.99) = 0.90.
There are various criticisms of basic prospect theory that have led to a 
refined version known as ‘cumulative’ prospect theory. But these details need 
not concern us here. The point is simply that prospect theory is one amongst 
a number of behavioural or non-expected utility decision theories. These theo-
ries are varied in form and motivation. Moreover, they are understood in 
different ways. Some consider their favoured behavioural decision theory to 
be a challenge to EU theory as an account of rational choice. Others simply 
consider these decision theories to be better suited to empirical tasks because 
they represent the irrational agents that we mostly are. There is, however, a 
third way. The theories may, in specific contexts, be better for empirical tasks 
because they represent rational choice given a limited or crude interpretation 
of outcomes. Prospect theory, for instance, may be considered useful because 
it can accommodate varying risk attitudes and yet still confine the descrip-
tion of outcomes to monetary amounts or material goods.
3.2 Game Theory: The Reductionist Critique
Some of these points have bearing on a further criticism of game theory: 
that it is inappropriately reductionist in its representation of social interaction, 
given that the basic units of game models are individuals, and specifically, 
their preferences. Indeed, game theory is paradigmatic of methodological indi-
vidualism, a term first used to describe the Weberian programme of explain-
ing group-level phenomena in terms of the attitudes and behaviour of the 
individuals who constitute the relevant groups. It is a form of explanation 
whereby groups are reduced to their constituent individuals. As we see in 
Chapter 6, some argue, however, that depicting individuals as basic is grossly 
misleading, given the way individuals themselves are shaped by social norms 
and shared institutions. In other words, the charge is that game theory has 
the arrow of explanation going the wrong way—from individual attitudes 
to social arrangements rather than from social arrangements to individual 
attitudes.
There is both a negative and a positive response to this charge. Let us begin 
with the negative or defensive line, and that is that the critics are confusing 
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their targets. They are arguing against atomism, where individuals are conceived 
as asocial entities that interact but do not influence each other’s psychology. 
But atomism neither implies nor is implied by methodological individualism. 
To begin with, as already emphasized, there is no reason to take a narrow view 
with respect to the outcomes that individuals care about; the agents in a game 
model may be sensitive to each other’s plights and to all sorts of social fac-
tors that go beyond material goods. Furthermore, the provenance of agents’ 
attitudes is left open; it may well be that agents’ preferences were socially con-
ditioned or in other words simply reflect the dominant attitudes of the group.
More generally, the existing social and institutional arrangements act as 
constraints on individuals, and play a corresponding role in game models. 
Beyond the agents’ preferences, the prevailing social setting determines what 
strategies are actually available to agents, and the sorts of outcomes that result 
from combinations of strategy choices. For instance, the institutional setting 
of scientific publishing constrains scientists’ options with respect to project 
funding and submission of work, and also influences the outcomes associated 
with the various players’ choices of projects and submissions. When choos-
ing an avenue of work, the scientist must take into account the competition 
of her peers and also their expected assessment of her work, as this, together 
with the procedures of journals and grant agencies, partially determines her 
outcomes. The social setting, in other words, shapes the ‘rules of the game’, 
and this is expressed in the parameters of a game model. In other words, game 
theory need not be blind to the fact that individuals are embedded in a social/
institutional context!
The critic might nonetheless push further and argue that the real explana-
tory task is to explain these social forces and institutions that constrain indi-
viduals, and not simply to posit them in a model. To some extent, however, 
this argument misses the mark. A scientific model can only represent/explain 
some limited aspect of the world. In one model, particular social norms or 
institutions may serve as boundary conditions or constraining assumptions, 
but this is not to say that the emergence and/or persistence of these institu-
tions cannot be explained via a different game model. Presumably, in such a 
model, ‘higher-order’ or more basic institutions will serve as the background 
constraints. Returning to our scientific publishing example, a different game 
model could be used to explain the procedures of the publishing business 
that served as the institutional context in the model alluded to; the players 
in the new model might be competing journals or grant agencies, rather than 
scientists themselves. The ‘higher order’ institutions will presumably amount 
to the broader economic and educational setting which shapes the possibili-
ties and outcomes for the scientific journals.
The appeal to different orders of game models goes some way towards 
answering the critic’s charge that game theory does not explain what we most 
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want to understand: social forces and institutions. There remains the prob-
lem, however, of explaining the mechanisms by which social forces shape 
individual preferences. We can describe ever richer layers of game models, 
but these models are still underpinned, at bottom, by fixed individual prefer-
ences. Indeed, this must be acknowledged as a limit of standard game theory 
(if not evolutionary game theory); it does not elucidate the process of prefer-
ence change, since a basic ingredient of any game model is the set of players 
with their fixed preferences over prospects.
So much for the negative argument—what game models need not be. In 
short, they need not assume asocial agents. The positive argument is that the 
insights afforded by game models can be very valuable. In fact, Weber claimed 
that individualist explanation is what distinguishes the social sciences from 
other sciences: a key role of the social sciences is to offer an interpretative 
explanation of action in terms of subjective attitudes, and only individuals, as 
opposed to groups, are the locus of subjective attitudes. The basic idea is that 
we do not properly understand what people do unless we understand why 
they do it, and to answer such questions we must inevitably appeal to the 
beliefs and desires of individuals.
Furthermore, some striking cases highlight that we ignore individual atti-
tudes at our peril. We need not look further than games like the Prisoners’ 
Dilemma, introduced earlier. This game shows that, even if there is a col-
lective goal or a common preferred outcome within a group, this outcome 
may nonetheless not be realized due to the structure of individual incentives. 
(Recall for the Prisoners’ Dilemma that both agents value the fruits of coop-
eration, but, alas, both have an incentive to ‘free-ride’.) The contemporary 
social and political theorist Jon Elster makes much of these game-theoretic 
insights in arguing for the acceptance of methodological individualism. If a 
common goal is salient in a group, we may make hasty predictions that the 
goal will be achieved, when a closer examination at the level of individuals 
would reveal otherwise. Elster (1985) appeals to a striking example in politi-
cal science to make this point vivid: Marxist theory. He argues that Marxists 
appealed to the general will of the proletariat as the predicted driver of social 
change and failed to appreciate the more subtle motivations of individual 
workers. These individuals may well be sympathetic to the end-result of revo-
lutionary change but nonetheless have an incentive to free-ride on the revo-
lutionary efforts of others.
Some decades earlier in the twentieth century, and prior to the populari-
zation of games like the Prisoners’ Dilemma, the economist Friedrich von 
Hayek made similar cautionary remarks about the realization of social ideals. 
Hayek did not stress free-riding so much as the different frames of motiva-
tion of individual citizens versus policy-makers. While policy-makers may 
be keenly aware of society-level variables like inflation, citizens going about 
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their regular lives do not generally respond to these factors but rather have a 
more local set of concerns. The upshot is that the connection between mac-
roeconomic variables and individual behaviour is not straightforward. The 
best-laid plans for the collective may be difficult to orchestrate at the individ-
ual level. (This is, in a sense, the flip-side of the invisible hand phenomenon, 
where unorchestrated individual activity leads to the appearance of planning 
at the collective level.)
Hayek’s message is that we should be sceptical of social planning ini-
tiatives. We need not accept his conclusion, but we should take heed of 
Hayek’s worries. Indeed, the conclusion one might draw is that social plan-
ning proposals may be better understood through careful game-theoretic 
modelling!
4. Concluding Remarks
One major conclusion to draw from this chapter is that we should not ask 
whether choice models, in general, are true/false or unfalsifiable in the social 
sciences, but rather whether particular choice models are useful. To be useful, 
a model must be true enough, and it must yield insights or predictions that 
justify the trouble of modelling in the first place. Furthermore, the question 
of how we can permissibly construct choice models, and, in particular, define 
outcomes, is misguided in the empirical setting, even if the question is impor-
tant in the normative setting. What are the appropriate properties of decision 
outcomes in empirical models simply depends on what facilitates adequate 
explanation and/or prediction.
A consequence of these points is that we cannot take for granted that the 
best empirical models are expected utility models. Having said that, the 
expected utility principle has a powerful simplicity, and it underlies much 
analysis in game theory, so should not be dismissed too hastily.
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